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Respondent, State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund ("ISIF") submits its
Respondent's/Cross-Appellant's Brief as follows:

I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellants, Hagadone Corp. and Royal Indemnity Co. (collectively "Royal"),
appeals the Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and
Recommendation, entered on May 14, 2007 (CR, pp. 191-203), and Order, also entered
on May 14, 2007.

(CR, pp. 204-205).

Appellants' primary contention is that the

Commission erred in determining that it had failed to prove ISIF's liability for any
proportionate share of Claimant's total and permanent disability.

ISIF also cross-

appeal's the Commission's May 14, 2007 Findings, Conclusion, Recommendation and
corresponding Order on the basis that the Commission erred in failing to rule that Royal
was collaterally estopped from asserting liability against ISIF for a proportionate share
of the Claimant's total and permanent disability due to the Industrial Commission's
ruling in the first proceeding, in which Royal was found liable for all Claimant's total and
permanent disability benefits.
Claimant Robert Stoddard, who was employed by Hagadone, asserted a
worker's compensation complaint, alleging the entitlement to disability benefits as a
result of a May 5, 1996 industrial accident. (CR, p. 1). Stoddard also filed a second
worker's compensation complaint with regard to an accident which allegedly occurred
on October 10, 1997. (CR, p. 4). A third complaint was later filed based on an alleged
industrial accident which occurred on May 11, 1999. (CR, p. 20). On May 19, 2000,
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these three complaints were consolidated. (CR, p. 30). There is no dispute that Mr.
Stoddard was 63 years of age at the time of his last accident. (CR, p. 185).
· While the face of the three complaints does not reveal that Mr. Stoddard was
initially alleging total and permanent disability as a result of the industrial accidents, it is
clear that Royal became aware, at some point during the pendancy of the proceedings,
that Stoddard was claiming total and permanent disability under the odd-lot doctrine and
that one of the issues to be determined at hearing was how total and permanent
disability should be apportioned. See Appx., Exh A (Notice of Hearing, dated 7/24/00); ·

Exh. B (portions of the transcript of the 3/14/01 hearing in front of Referee Michael E.
Powers); Exh. C (Hagadone's Post-Hearing Brief).
After conducting a hearing on March 14, 2001, in which evidence was presented
before a referee for the Commission, on September 7, 2001, the Commission entered
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation. (CR, pp. 33-62). The
Commission concluded that Stoddard was permanently and totally disabled pursuant to
the Odd-lot doctrine.

(CR, p. 61 ).

General was determined to be liable for 20% of

Stoddard's permanent and total disability award, while Royal was assigned 60% of that
liability. Id.
Stoddard, concerned as to why only 80% of his permanent and total disability
award was assigned by the Commission, filed a Motion for Payment Under Idaho Code
§72-313, Alternative Motion for Clarification (Reconsideration).
Royal also filed its own Motion for Reconsideration.

(CR, pp. 104-113).

(CR, pp. 117-118).

In its

Memorandum, Royal noted that it was not challenging the Commission's finding that the
Claimant was totally and permanently disabled under the Odd-lot doctrine. Rather, the
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Commission was asked to reconsider the apportionment of the award. (CR, p. 125).
General filed its own Motion for Reconsideration, whereby it asked that its proportion of
liability be re-evaluated and for the Commission to clarify its prior order. (CR, p. 129).
On December 14, 2001, the Industrial Commission issued its Order Regarding
Reconsideration.

(CR, pp. 171-177).

In that Order, the Commission expressed its

frustration in attempting to proportion the full amount of Stoddard's total and permanent
disability award between the two sureties, as cases in which a worker with a permanent
impairment who incurs a subsequent disability rendering the worker totally and
permanently disabled usually involve the payment of lifetime benefits by ISIF. (CR, pp.
172-173). However, the sureties never joined ISIF in Stoddard's proceeding. (CR, p.
173). The Commission determined that the last accident caused Stoddard to suffer total
and permanent disability and that, in light of the fact that were no other facts or
circumstances presented to the Commission upon which to guide the apportionment
analysis, Royal was assigned full liability for Stoddard's total and permanent disability
benefits. (CR, p. 174). No appeal was taken to this Court.
On May 20, 2002, Royal filed its complaint against ISIF, claiming that ISIF was
liable for Stoddard's total and permanent disability benefits.

(CR, p. 184).

ISIF

answered the complaint on June 4, 2002. (CR, p. 188). On October 7, 2002, ISIF filed
its Petition for Declaratory Ruling. See Appx., Exh. D. In its Petition, ISIF argued that
Royal's claims should be dismissed through application of the doctrine of waiver and/or
collateral estoppel. Further, ISIF contended that the Commission's December 14, 2001
Order barred Royal's complaint pursuant to I.C. § 72-718 and that its due process rights
would be denied if Royal was allowed to proceed against the ISIF. Finally, ISIF argued
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that Royal would be unable to establish the requisite elements under I.C. § 72-332 for
ISIF liability. Ultimately, ISIF's primary contention for dismissal of the complaint was the
allegation that Royal had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of Stoddard's
right to receive total and permanent disability benefits, was clearly determined to be fully
liable for the payment of those benefits and failed to join ISIF in that proceeding to seek
a determination whether ISIF should be liable for a portion of Stoddard's benefits. See
Appx., Exh. E, F (ISIF's briefing in support of its Motion for Declaratory Ruling).

On August 27, 2003, the Commission issued a Declaratory Ruling. See Appx.,
Exh. G.

In that Ruling, the Commission once again noted that, in the underlying

proceeding, it had found Stoddard permanently and totally disabled pursuant to the oddlot doctrine and declared Royal liable for the benefits.

Id., p. 5.

However, the

Commission did not believe the application of collateral estoppel was relevant in this
case because the issues previously disputed between Stoddard and Royal were not the
same as the potential issues that would be litigated between ISIF and Royal. Id., p. 6.
The Commission noted that there are different standards for liability against ISIF for
total and permanent disability than there are when assessing liability against the
employer/surety. Id., p. 7.
Although the Commission admitted that the result of allowing Royal's suit against
ISIF to go forward may require re-litigation of the issue of total permanent disability, it
believed that collateral estoppel did not operate to bar the claim because ISIF's liability
under I.C. § 72-332 had not been litigated in the prior proceeding. Id., p. 7-8. The
Commission also found that there was no direct evidence that Royal intentionally
relinquished its right to pursue ISi F liability simply by not joining them in the previous
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case, that I.C. §72-718 did not serve to bar Royal's suit against ISIF and that any of
ISIF's due process concerns would be addressed by giving it a meaningful opportunity
to be heard when determining its liability under I.C. § 72-332. Id., pp. 9-11.
The case between Royal and IS.IF proceeded to hearing on July 19, 2006. On
May 14, 2007, the Commission entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and
Recommendation. (CR, pp. 191-203). In that decision, the Commission noted ISIF's
continuing objection that the prior proceeding between Stoddard and Royal barred the
re-litigation of the issue of the apportionment of liability for Stoddard's total and
permanent disability payments since Royal had been previously found liable for the full
amount of that award. (CR, p. 199). However, the Commission once again stated that.
ISIF was not a party to the first hearing and, therefore, that a traditional apportionment
analysis under I.C. § 72-332 had never been completed until this time. (CR, p. 200).
The Commission found that its ruling in the previous proceeding was specifically framed
in the context of the particular issues presented by Stoddard and Royal to the
Commission. Id.
While once again rejecting ISIF's collateral estoppel argument, the Commission
did find that Royal had failed to prove a "combination" under the "but for" test under I.C.
§72-332 with regard to the facts of this case. (CR, p. 200). The Commission found that
Stoddard was unemployable after his May 11, 1999 accident and injury and, therefore,
that the inquiry with regard to ISIF liability was whether Stoddard's pre-existing physical
impairments combined with the last accident to render him totally and permanently
disabled.

(CR, p. 201 ).

The Commission stated that the relevant inquiry was
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Stoddard's status of disability at the time of the second hearing wherein ISIF was
"allowed" to participate. (CR, p. 202). Ultimately, the Commission found:
At that time, Claimant was 70 years of age and was still totally and
permanently disabled. However, Mr. Brownell testified, and Mr. Crum did
not disagree, that when considering only Claimant's age and lack of
transferable skills to the sedentary labor market, Claimant was totally and
permanently disabled. It was Claimant's last industrial accident, for which
ISIF bears no responsibility, that landed him in the sedentary labor market.
ISIF's argument that based on these facts, there has been no showing
that any of Claimant's pre-existing impairments combined with his last
industrial accident to render him totally and permanently disabled so as to
invoke liability is persuasive .... Royal has failed to prove ISIF's liability for
any proportionate share of Claimant's total and permanent disability.

(CR, p. 202).
II.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Did the Industrial Commission commit error in failing to dismiss Royal's

Complaint against ISIF on the basis of collateral estoppel, wavier and/or the application
of 1.C. § 72-718?
2.

Did the Industrial Commission correctly base its determination of

Claimant's status of disability at the time of the second Industrial Commission hearing
on July 18, 2006?

111.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing an appeal from the Industrial Commission, this Court will uphold the
findings of the Commission if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence
in the record. /.C. § 72-732; Lethrud v. State, 126 Idaho 560, 563, 887 P.2d 1067,
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1070 (1995).

Evidence is "substantial and competent" if a reasonable mind might

accept such evidence as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion. Reiher v.
American Fine Foods, 126 Idaho 58, 60, 878 P.2d 757, 759 (1994). In reviewing a

decision from the Commission, all facts and inferences are viewed in the light most
favorable to the party who prevailed before the Commission. Dumaw v. J.L. Norton
Logging, 118 Idaho 150,155,795 P.2d 312,317 (1990). However, the Commission's

conclusions of law are freely reviewed by the Court. Idaho Const. art. V, § 9; Davaz v.
Priest River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333, 336, 870 P.2d 1292, 1295 (1994).

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises
free review. Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille School Dist. #84, 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134
P.3d 655, 658 (2006). Whether res judicata or collateral estoppel bars the re-litigation
of issues adjudicated in prior litigation between the parties is likewise a question of law
subject to free review. Smith v. U.S.R. V. Properties, LC, 141 Idaho 795, 798, 118
P.3d 127, 131 (2005).

IV.
ARGUMENT
A. Argument on Cross-Appeal: The Application of Collateral Estoppel, I.C. §
72-718 and Waiver

It is undisputed that Royal was aware, at least as early as July 21, 2000 (the date
of the Notice of Hearing), that Stoddard was claiming entitlement to an award for total
and permanent disability. This was almost nine months before the actual hearing to
determine Stoddard's entitlement to benefits. However, Royal chose not add ISIF as a
party to have it included in the apportionment of any total and permanent disability
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award.

Subsequently, the issue of Stoddard's status as totally and permanently

disabled was clearly litigated during the March 14, 2001 hearing. See Appx., Exh. B.
In its Order Regarding Consideration, the Commission conclusively decided the
issues surrounding Stoddard's claim for total and permanent disability.

The

Commission found that "Claimant experienced four accidents that eventually rendered
Claimant totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine." (CR, p. 173).
Further, the Commission found:
[u]nder the facts of this case, the Commission has determined that the last
accident caused Claimant to suffer total and permanent disability. No
other facts or circumstances have been presented to the -Commission.
Accordingly, the Commission finds that Royal should be fully liable for total
and permanent disability benefits.
(CR, p. 174). Royal, having been adjudicated solely liable for Stoddard's lifetime total

and permanent disability income benefits, did not appeal to this Court.

Rather, the

Commission's ruling became a final judgment, binding on Royal.
However, the Commission continues to maintain that Royal was entitled to assert
a collateral proceeding against ISIF whereby Royal could once again litigate Claimant's
disability status (even if such a process would not directly affect Claimant's benefits),
and apportionment of liability for Stoddard's total and permanent disability payments.
As explained in more detail below, the Commission's decision in this regard was
erroneous and not consistent with the dictates of Idaho Law.

1.

Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel
"Res judicata" is comprised of claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue

preclusion (collateral estoppal). "Under the principles of claim preclusion, a valid final
judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar
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to a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim." Hindmarsh v.
Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). Claim preclusion bars a subsequent

action between the same parties upon the same claim or upon claims "relating to the
same cause of action ... which might have been made." Id. Issue preclusion protects
litigants from litigating an identical issue with the same party or its privy. Rodriguez v.
Dep't of Corr., 136 ldaho 90, 92, 29 P.3d 401,403 (2001).

Separate tests are used to determine whether claim preclusion or issue
preclusion applies. See D.A.R., Inc. v. Sheffer, 134 Idaho 141, 144, 997 P.2d 602, 605
(2000). Five factors are required in order for issue preclusion to bar the re-litigation of
an issue determined in a prior proceeding: (1) the party against whom the earlier
decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the
earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue
presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually
decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior
litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity
with a party to the litigation. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 2007 Ida. LEXIS 63, 157 P.3d
613, 618 (2007).

Res judicata serves three fundamental purposes:

(1)

it preserves the

acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would
follow if the same matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the
public interest in protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and
(3)

it advances the private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims.
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Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 805 (quoting Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254,

257,668 P.2d 130, 133 (Ct. App. 1983)).
In support of its argument for the application of collateral estoppel in the
proceeding initiated by Royal, ISIF cited the case of Jackman v. Industrial Special
tndem. Fund, 129 Idaho 689,931 P.2d.1207 (1997). In Jackman, the claimant settled

his claims against the employer/surety pursuant to a lump sum agreement, which the
Commission approved, discharging the employer/surety of all liability relating to
claimant's accident.

Then, claimant filed an application requesting a hearing for

compensation and award against the ISIF, which was not a party to the first proceeding.
Id., at 690.

The claimant contended that, in his previous case against the

employer/surety, he was not given a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of
apportionment pursuant to J.C. § 72-332. Id., at 691. The Court rejected this argument,
noting:
Jackman's present claim against ISIF for apportionment is tied to
the same impairment rating Jackman relied upon in his claim against
[employer/surety]: 33% whole person impairment. Jackman had a fair
opportunity and incentive to vigorously litigate his whole person
impairment rating in Jackman's case against [employer/surety].
Jackman argues the doctrine of collateral estoppel should not be
applied in this case since the issue in the present case is distinguishable
from the issue raised in Jackman's action against [employer/surety).
Jackman contends that the issue in Jackman's case against SIF
was the total value of Jackman's claim against SIF and that the
apportioning of benefits between ISIF and SIF was never addressed in the
Agreement. ...
. . . Jackman cannot rely upon the same percentage impairment
rating in order to attain further benefits from ISIF. Jackman must present
additional evidence of impairment in order to increase his impairment
The issue presented in the proceeding against
rating.
[employer/surety), compensating Jackman for his impairment rating
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of 33% whole person, is identical to the issue Jackman presently
raises: whether ISIF must compensate Jackman for a portion of the
same 33% whole person impairment.
In order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, there must
be final judgment on the merits. On February 20, 1990, the commission
approved the Agreement, including the 33% whole person impairment
rating, pursuant to I.C. Section 72-404 .... The Commission's February
20, 1990 order, approving the Agreement pursuant to I.C. Section 72-404,
was a final judgment on the merits.
Despite the fact that ISIF was not a party to Jackman's
Agreement with [employer/surety], ISIF may still assert the doctrine
of collateral estoppel in the present case. Jackman was a party to
the prior action against [employer/surety] and is the party against
whom the plea of collateral estoppel has been asserted . ... (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. at 691-692.

Jackman attempted to avoid the application of collateral estoppel by framing the
issue being litigated so narrowly that the Court would have a basis to find that it was not
identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding. Jackman argued that his action
against ISIF was not barred because the issue of apportionment to ISIF was not
litigated or decided in the earlier suit (even though a full determination of his entitlement
to benefits was clearly litigated and decided). This Court was not persuaded by the
argument, as the larger issue of the extent of the claimant's injuries and the parties
responsible for the payment of benefits under the worker's compensation act had clearly
been previously decided.
In its Declaratory Ruling, the Commission dismissed the significance of the
Jackman decision, noting that the decision in that case was motivated primarily by a

fear of double recovery, a factor which is not significant here. See Appx., Exh. G, p. 78. However, the issue of preventing potential double recovery is but only one of the
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goals of res judicata. As noted above, the doctrine also seeks to prevent inconsistent
results, repetitious litigation and to protect finality of result. This Court in Jackman was
asserting that the claimant had his day in court, had the opportunity to litigate the issues
with respect to liability for his worker's compensation injury and was attempting to once
again assert the issue of apportionment and liability for his claims in a collateral
proceeding.
In this case, although both Royal and the Commission tried to frame the issue to
avoid the application of collateral estoppel, Royal has attempted to litigate the same
issues which were fully and fairly litigated, as well as actually decided, in an earlier
proceeding - whether Stoddard is totally and permanently disabled and what party
bears the liability for the apportionment of the total and permanent disability benefits.
Under I.C. §72-332, Royal had the burden in this proceeding to demonstrate that
Stoddard's

permanent

pre-existing

physical

impairments

"combined

with"

compensable industrial injury so as to result in total and permanent disability.

his
See

Eckhart v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 133 Idaho 260, 985 P.2d 685 (1999);
Bybee v. State, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 29 Idaho 76, 921 P.2d 1200

(1996).
Thus, in order for liability against ISIF to be recognized in this case, Royal had to
prove that "but for" Stoddard's permanent pre-existing physical impairments, he would
not be totally and permanently disabled.

Likewise, Royal had to show that "but for"

Stoddard's industrial injury in 1999, he would not be totally and permanently disabled.
However, in this case, it is clear that the issue of "combination" had been fully and finally
resolved in the earlier proceeding. The Commission in its December 14, 2001 Order

RESPONDENT'S/CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF -12

found that it was the last accident that caused Stoddard to suffer total and permanent
disability and that Royal was liable for all of Stoddard's total and permanent disability
payments.

(CR, p. 171 ).

Both of these findings should have precluded Royal from

arguing in a collateral proceeding that it was actually Stoddard's pre-existing impairment
"combined with" his last accident which rendered him totally and permanently disabled.
Such an argument is clearly at odds with the Commission's earlier decision.
The Commission, in its May 14, 2007 Findings/Conclusion/Recommendation,
tried to once again address ISIF's concerns regarding the application of collateral
estoppel. (CR, p. 200). In once again dismissing the argument, the Commission noted
that ISIF was not a party in the original proceeding, preventing a traditional
apportionment analysis under /.C. §72-332 from taking place. Thus, the Commission
ruled that Royal was able to litigate apportionment under that statute in a collateral
proceeding against ISIF. Respondent believes this ruling is tantamount to putting the
cart before the horse.
It should be once again noted that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is designed
to avoid the re-litigation of issues already decided, where the party had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue. See, e.g., Magic Valley Radiology, P.A., v. Ko/ouch,
123 Idaho 434, 849 P.2d 107 (1993). ISIF respectfully asserts that the Commission
confused what Royal actually chose to litigate in the underlying proceeding with what it
had the opportunity to litigate. There is no dispute that Royal had its chance to argue
that Stoddard's pre-existing conditions combined with his last accident as the cause of
his total and permanent disability and to join ISIF to seek apportionment of total and
permanent disability benefits. However, Royal, for whatever reason, chose not to take
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that course of action. Thus, the Commission found that the last accident was the cause
of the total disability and Royal bore the full burden of paying for those benefits.
ISIF would also emphasize that Royal was not prejudiced by this determination.
It had made the strategic decision not to join ISIF in the original proceeding and to avoid
a traditional apportionment analysis under I.C. § 72-332. However, ISIF was clearly
prejudiced by the Commission's decision to allow Royal to assert a collateral suit
against it.

Stoddard had already been determined to be totally and permanently

disabled in the prior proceeding. Thus, the parties faced one of two courses in the
current proceeding: either ISIF would have no opportunity to contest Stoddard's status
as totally and permanently disabled in the collateral proceeding (as the issue was earlier
fully and finally decided),. or the Commission would have to allow ISIF to contest the
issue of total and permanent disability and potentially find itself making an inconsistent
ruling on the same issue.
The first option clearly would have violated ISIF's due process rights in this
proceeding and the second result is clearly in violation of the precepts of collateral
estoppel. The Commission noted that a different analysis of liability may have been
utilized in the initial proceeding had ISIF been a party at that time.

(CR, p. 200).

Further, it is clear, based upon a review of the record, that the Commission struggled to
correctly apportion benefits for total and permanent disability in the initial proceeding
since no one had added ISIF as a party. However, ISIF should not have had to bear the
time, expense and resources for Royal's failure to make use of the opportunity to
conduct a traditional apportionment analysis under I.C. § 72-332 in the original
proceeding. Thus, Royal was determined to be solely liable for Stoddard's total and
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permanent disability benefits and should have been collaterally estopped from litigating
what both was and should have been litigated in the prior proceeding.

2.

Application of I.C. § 72-718
Another issue which has basically been ignored by both Royal and the

Commission in these proceedings is the application of I.C. § 72-718 in the analysis of
whether Royal was lawfully entitled to assert this action against ISIF. /.C. § 72-718
states, in pertinent part that, "[a] decision of the commission, in the absence of fraud,
shall be final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated by the commission upon filing
the decision in the office of the commission ... " Thus, the Commission's September 7,
2001 Findings and Conclusions, along with its December 14, 2001 Order, were final and
conclusive as to all the matters adjudicated therein. Once again, Royal failed to appeal
either of those two decisions.
The Commission clearly adjudicated whether Stoddard was totally and
permanently disabled in the prior proceeding. Indeed, Royal submitted evidence in the
attempt to rebut Stoddard's total and permanent disability contentions. While Royal was
found to be solely liable for Stoddard's total and permanent disability benefits, it has
sought apportionment of Stoddard's disability benefit award in this proceeding. In other
words, Royal utilized this proceeding to seek relief of a portion of its responsibility
regarding Stoddard's benefits - a responsibility the Commission had already decided
belonged solely with Royal.
Further, the Commission had already decided that it was the last accident which
caused Stoddard to suffer total and permanent disability. However, Royals contentions
in this proceeding, if successful, would require the Commission to reach a conclusion in
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clear contravention of its early award. A review of the factual and procedural history of
this case demonstrates that the Commission's prior decision in this case should have
operated to bar Royal's suit against ISIF. See also Whittaker v. Cecil, 69 S.W.3d 69
(Ky. 2002) (Compensation Board's final award and employer's failure to raise

apportionment argument against special fund on reconsideration or on appeal barred
the employer's subsequent action against the special fund).

3.

Application of Waiver
It has already been established that Royal was aware that the issue with respect

to Stoddard's claim for total and permanent disability benefits was being litigated in the
prior proceeding. Indeed, Royal fully contested the issue. It is also undisputed that
Royal had a full and fair opportunity to join ISIF in the proceeding so as to seek
apportionment for any total and permanent disability benefits to which the Commission
found Stoddard was entitled. However, Royal chose not to pursue such a course. This
action clearly implicates the doctrine of waiver.
Waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage.
Brand 5 Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731,734,639 P.2d 432 (1981). "It is a voluntary act
and implies election by a party to dispense with something of value or to forego some
right or advantage which fthe party] might at fthe party's] option have demanded and
insisted upon." Crouch v. Bischoff, 78 Idaho 364, 304 P.2d 646 (1956).

"Waiver

arising out of conduct is in the nature of estoppel." Idaho Bank of Commerce v.
Chastain, 86 Idaho 146, 383 P.2d 849 (1963). It is an equitable doctrine based upon
fairness and justice and, in order to establish waiver the intention to waive must clearly
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appear, although it may be established by conduct. Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning
Miriing Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1992).

The concept of waiver is grounded in the clear intention of a party to relinquish a
right that it holds. Royal clearly had a right to add ISIF to the underlying suit and argue
for apportionment under /.C. § 72-332. Royal's decision not to do so, even if perplexing,
constitutes a clear waiver.

Certainly, the issues of permanent disability and

apportionment should not have been re-litigated when Royal made an election to waive
its right to seek apportionment from ISIF in the prior suit.

Under these facts, the

Commission should have concluded that Royal waived its right to seek apportionment
from ISIF in this proceeding.

B. Argument on Royal's Appeal: When should a Claimant's Disability Status
be Analyzed?

ISIF's other argument presented to the Commission in Royal's suit was the
contention that Royal had failed to prove a "combination" under the "but for" test (/.C. §
72-332) under the facts of this case.

In the Commission's May 14, 2007 Findings, it

was noted that the existence of several pre-existing permanent physical impairments
were determined in the earlier proceeding.

(CR, p. 201).

Further, the Commission

noted the undisputed fact that Stoddard was unemployable after his May 11, 1999
accident and injury. Thus, in this proceeding the operative question became whether
Stoddard's pre-existing physical impairments combined with the last accident to render
him totally and permanently disabled· or, stated in another manner, whether Stoddard
would have been totally and permanently disabled but for his last accident.
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Logically, ISIF does not bear the liability for the payment of total and permanent
disability benefits where other factors may combine with an industrial accident to render
a claimant totally and permanently disabled. Thus, the question becomes the operative
point in time in which any "other factors" (besides the pre-existing impairment and fact
of the last industrial injury) may be judged for purposes of determining their effect in
causing the claimant's total and permanent disability.
In this case, the Commission noted that Stoddard was able to work, albeit with
restrictions and accommodation, prior to his last accident. (CR, p. 202). The Findings
also state that Stoddard was not able to work after his last accident, that his employer
was unable to further accommodate him after the last accident and that Stoddard's
legitimate attempts to locate work had failed. There was also testimony that the last
accident resulted in significant physical limitations which placed him in the sedentary
work category.
However, the Commission noted that the relevant inquiry in this case was
Stoddard's disability status at the time of the second hearing wherein ISIF was allowed
to participate. At that time, Stoddard was 70 years of age and was still totally and
permanently disabled. (CR, p. 202). Thus, the Commission analyzed whether other
factors, such as Stoddard's age, rendered him totally and permanently disabled. The
Commission noted testimony from the hearing which supported the conclusion that,
when considering only Stoddard's age and lack of transferable skills to the sedentary
labor marker, Stoddard was totally and permanently disabled.

Id.

Further, the

Commission ruled that it was Stoddard's last industrial accident, for which ISIF bore no
responsibility, which placed Stoddard in the sedentary labor market.
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Thus, the

Commission found, there had been no showing that any of Stoddard's pre-existing
impairments combined with his last industrial accident to render him totally and
permanently disabled. Id.
Royal's main contention of error on appeal is that the Commission was obligated
by law to judge Stoddard's disability status, for purposes of adjudicating ISIF's liability
for apportionment of benefits, at the time of his last industrial injury in May 1999, rather
than the time of hearing in this matter: Royal asserts that if the Commission had utilized
the 1999 date for analyzing disability and followed its own analysis in its 2001 decision,
it should have been able to determine that the last industrial accident combined with
Stoddard's pre-existing permanent impairments to render him totally and permanently
disabled.
1.

The Industrial Commission Utilized the Correct Date of the Second
Hearing in this Case as the Time at Which to Assess ISIF's Liability.

The sole legal authority Royal cites in support of its contention that the
Commission utilized the incorrect time period for the assessment of Stoddard's status of
disability is Colpaert v. Larsons, Inc., 115 Idaho 825, 771 P.2d 46 (1989).

Royal

asserts that Colpaert stands for the proposition that the appropriate time to determine
whether ISIF bears responsibility for the payment of benefits under I.C. § 72-332 is at
the time of the last industrial accident.

However, a review of the decision clearly

demonstrates that Royal has misinterpreted the case.
The issue in Colpaert was · whether the Commission had erred in its
determination that the claimant had suffered from a permanent physical impairment
which was "manifest" prior to her accident of December 12, 1982.

Id. at 828.

Obviously, this was a key issue in the proceeding, as ISIF liability only arises upon a
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finding that there was, in fact, a manifest permanent, pre-existing physical impairment
which combined with the last industrial accident to render the claimant permanently and
totally disabled. In Colpaert, there was a dispute as to when the claimant's permanent
physical impairment was manifest, i.e., whether it pre-existed the latest industrial
accident.
The Court noted that the rating of the permanent physical impairment (to
determine whether it pre-existed the last industrial accident) is made at a point in time
just prior to a claimant's industrial accident or injury. Id., at 829. In other words, the
time. for determining whether the claimant suffered from a pre-existing permanent
physical impairment is at the time of the last industrial accident. The Colpaert decision
made no comment whatsoever as to the date at which a claimant's disability is judged
for purposes of ISIF liability.
However, the statutory scheme for determining the circumstances under which
ISIF is liable for a share of a claimant's total and permanent disability award clearly
establishes that the date for determining a claimant's disability status is the time of the
actual hearing determining ISIF's liability.

In any analysis of a worker's claim to

permanent disability, the Commission first looks to Idaho Code § 72-423, which
requires an analysis of whether a claimant's ability to engage in gainful activity is
reduced or absent "and no fundamental or marked change in the future can be
reasonably expected." Under Idaho Code§ 72-423, a permanent disability necessarily
contains a temporal component in that the statute refers to a condition wherein no
fundamental or marked change in the future can be reasonably expected.
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A permanent disability evaluation is also required under Idaho Code § 72-425.
That statute mandates an appraisal of the Claimant's "present and probable future
ability to engage in gainful activity as it is affected by the medical factor permanent
impairment and by pertinent non-medical factors as provided in§ 72-430, Idaho Code."
Under Idaho Code § 72-430, the Commission is required to consider age when making
a disability determination.
Thus, in evaluating a claimant's permanent disability, the Industrial Commission
is to render "an appraisal of the injured employee's present and probable future ability to
engage in gainful activity as it is affected by the medical factor of permanent impairment
and by pertinent non-medical factors, as provided in Section 72-430." Idaho Code §
72-425.

ISIF contends that the statutory reference to "present" ability to engage in gainful
activity necessarily refers to the date of hearing. There is no other "present" opportunity
for the Commission to review the evidence, to assess the Claimant's medical condition,
and to make an appraisal of his "present" ability to work.

Likewise, the reference to

"probable future ability" is necessarily a reference to the time period following the date
of hearing. Therefore, it is the claimant's permanent disability as of the date of hearing
which must be evaluated by the Industrial Commission in any case involving ISIF.
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Idaho Code § 72-430 requires the
Commission to consider other factors in its disability determination, including the
claimant's age and diminished ability to compete in the labor market, considering all the
personal and economic circumstances of the employee. Obviously, these factors are
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not always the stagnant from the time of the last industrial accident and the time of the
hearing.
The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund is not a substitute for a pension or
retirement account and does not serve as a general casualty insurance policy.

As

noted above, ISIF liability is implicated only where a pre-existing permanent physical
impairment combines with a later industrial accident to render a claimant totally and
permanently disabled. If the claimant suffers from a brain tumor or becomes severely
injured in a car accident after the latest industrial accident and prior to the hearing, there
would be a reasonable basis for finding that the affects of the brain tumor or car
accident, alone, render the claimant totally and permanently disabled, regardless of a
pre-existing permanent physical impairment.
In other words, the purposes of the worker's compensation system are served by
judging the claimant's disability status at the time of the hearing where ISIF's liability is
to be determined. Only at that time can the Commission truly judge whether the "but
for" test has been satisfied or whether other medical or non-medical factors have
contributed to or caused the claimant to suffer total and permanent disability. Indeed,
this is why this Court has previously stated that "the time of the hearing is the crucial
point at which a claimant's permanent disability is to be permanently settled." Davaz v.
Priest River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333,337, 870 P.2d 1292, 1296 (1994).

In this case, the Commission properly determined Stoddard's disability status
(including the reasons for his disability) at the time of the hearing in which ISIF was a
party. In conducting its analysis, the Commission found that Stoddard's disability was
not "but for" both his pre-existing physical impairments and his industrial injuries.
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Rather, the Commission was entitled to look at Stoddard's advanced age and lack of
transferable skills to the sedentary labor market following the termination of
employment. Indeed, the Commission was obligated, under Idaho Code § 72-425, to
give legal effect to these factors and was fully within the bounds of the law to determine
whether these factors, without regard to other factors such as a pre-existing permanent
physical impairment, combined with the last industrial accident, actually rendered
Stoddard totally and permanently disabled.
IV.
CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the Industrial Commission's previous orders finding that the last
accident caused Stoddard to suffer total and permanent disability and that Royal was
fully liable for the payment of Stoddard's disability benefits serves to collaterally estop
Royal from seeking a reconsideration of those issues in the current proceeding against
ISIF.

Further, the application of I.C. § 72-718 demands that the Commission's

September 7, 2001 Findings/Conclusions, along with its December 14, 2001 Order,
were final and conclusive in determining Stoddard's disability status and liability for
disability payments. Royal's proceeding against ISIF is an unlawful attempt to re-open
those judgments. Moreover, Royal had the full and fair opportunity to add ISIF as a
defendant in the underlying proceeding involving the Claimant, in order to seek
apportionment of any total and permanent disability benefits, and clearly chose not to do
so. These actions indisputably constitute a voluntary and intentional waiver on the part
of Royal to seek apportionment against ISIF in this proceeding. On these bases, the
portions

of

the

Industrial

Commission's
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May

14,

2007

Findings/Conclusion/Recommendation and corresponding Order with regard to ISIF's
contentions regarding the application of collateral estoppel, waiver and I.C. § 72-718
should be reversed and Royal's suit against ISIF seeking apportionment of Stoddard's
total and permanent disability benefits should be dismissed.
Finally, there is no merit to Royal's contention that the Industrial Commission
utilized the incorrect date in judging Stoddard's status of disability. Both Idaho statutory
and appellate case law clearly establishes that the time of the hearing where ISIF is a
party is the crucial point at which a claimant's permanent disability is to be permanently
settled. Therefore, the portion of the Industrial Commission's May 14, 2007 decision
dismissing Royal's suit against ISIF upon the finding that ISIF had failed to prove that
Stoddard's pre-existing impairments combined with his last industrial accident to render
him totally and permanently disabled should be upheld.

~

DATED this~ay of January 2008.

z:: / f&t~

By
/ Kenneth L. Mallea
Attorney for Respondent/Cross-Appellant
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.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~) day of January, 2008, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S/CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF by
delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by the method indicated
below, addressed as follows:

181

Eric S. Bailey
Bowen & Bailey, L.L.P.
P.0; Box 1007
Boise, Idaho 83701-1007
Telephone: (208) 344-7200
Facsimile: (208) 344-9670
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants

D
D
D

7

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

:z;;::/ ~~
Kenneth L Mallea
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

ROBERT J. STODDARD,
Claimant,
V.

)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO. 34335

)
THE HAGADONE CORPORATION,
Employer, and ROY AL INDEMNITY
COMPANY, Surety,
Defendants/Appellants/CrossRespondents,
and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,

)

)
)

ADDITIONAL DOCUMENT
Notice of Hearing, Filed 7/24/00

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

Defendant/Respondent/CrossAppellant.

)
)

Attorney for Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Respondents
ERIC S. BAILEY
PO BOX 1007
BOISE, ID 83701
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant
KENNETH L. MALLEA
POBOX857
MERIDIAN, ID 83680

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

ROBERT J. STODDARD,
Claimant,
V.

THE HAGADONE CORPORATION,
Employer,
and
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY
OF AMERICA, Surety,
and
ROYAL INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IC 96-018310
97-036904
99-016897
NOTICE OF HEARING

FILED

JUL 2 4 2000
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a hearing will be held in the above-entitled matter on

JANUARY 25, 2001, at 9:30 a.m., for one full day, in the Industrial Commission field office, 1221
Ironwood Drive, Suite 100, City of Coeur d'Alene, County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, on the
following issues:
1.

Whether Claimant suffered personal injuries arising out of and in the course of

employment;
2.

Whether Claimant's injuries were the result of accidents arising out of and in the

course of employment;
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3.

Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care, and the extent

thereof;
4.

Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary partial and/or temporary total disability

(TPD/TTD) benefits, and the extent thereof;
5.

Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent partial impairment (PPI), and the extent

thereof;
6.

Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent partial or permanent total disability

(PPD/PTD) in excess of permanent impairment, and the extent thereof;
7.

Whether apportionment for a pre-existing condition pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-406

is appropriate; and,
8.

Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees due to Employer/Surety's unreasonable

denial of compensation as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-804.
DATED in Boise, Idaho, thi~ fday o f ~ /

, 2000.

INDUSTRlAL COMMISSION

Michael E. Powers, Referee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on th~f day of,-::;ftf,~'-'5{-::__--,,-,, 2000, a true and correct copy
of the NOTICE OF HEARING was served by
ates Certified Mail upon each of the
following:
JOHN T MITCHELL
408 E SHERMAN AVE. STE 316
COEURD'ALENEID 83814
BENTLEY G STROMBERG
PO BOX 1510
LEWISTON ID 83501-1510
GLENNA CHRISTENSEN
POBOX829
BOISEID 83701°0829
M & M COURT REPORTING
410 E SHERMAN AVE STE 201
COEURD'ALENEID 83814

and by "E" mail upon:
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
FO CDA

cjh
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